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NOTES AND COMMENTS
other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise." The legislative
intent to give the National Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction
is apparent.
In Manning v. Feidelson, 175 Tenn. 576, 136 S.W. (2d) 510 (1940),
a state court of equity was petitioned for initial relief before exhaust-
ing the remedies of National Labor Relations Board. The Court ar-
rived at a decision similar to the principal case by analogy to cases
involving jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. See
Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379-387 (1887), 49 U.S.C. §11-18
(1941), especially §9. State courts are excluded from jurisdiction in
these cases. 11 Am. Jur. 130.
A recent case involving jurisdiction of another administrative
board, the Railway Labor Board, reveals a tendency to give complain-
ant, in like circumstances, an election of either administrative or
judicial relief. Moore v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 312 U.S. 630 (1941);
see Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F.(2d) 235 (App. D.C.
1941); Notes (1942) 27 Iowa L. Rev. 641, (1942) 55 Harv. L. Rev. 859,
(1942), 51 Yale L. J. 666. However, the jurisdictional section of Rail-
way Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) as amended, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934),
45 U.S.C. §153(1) (1941), stipulated that disputes "shall be referred to
the Adjustment Board." In 1934, the mandatory "shall" was amended
to the permissive "may." The court's interpretation of the legislative
intent was based on this amendment.
TRADE REGULATION
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N CASE
The American Medical Association and the Medical Society of the
District of Columbia and certain practicing physicians and officers of
these associations were indicted for conspiring to violate Sec. 3 of the
Sherman Act' by hindering and obstructing the operations of Group
Health Association, a nonprofit corporation organized by Government
employees to provide medical care and hospitalization on a risk sharing
prepayment basis. 2 Held, the associations were guilty of a conspiracy
to restrain trade in the Dist. of Col. Amer. Med. Assn. v. United States,
63 Sup. Ct. 326 (1943).3
1. 15 U.S.C. 3.
2. The district court sustained the defendant's demurrer and held
that neither the practice of medicine nor the Group Health Associ-
ation activities was trade within the meaning of the Sherman
Act. 28 F. Supp. 752 (1939). The court of appeals reversed,
holding that either could be trade. 110 F. (2d) 703 (1940). The
district court then convicted the associations but acquitted the
individual defendants which was affirmed by the court of ap-
peals. 130 F. (2d) 233 (1942).
3. This case has caused much comment. The Chicago Tribune, April
7, 1941, thought that since the American Medical Association had
been held to be a trade that they should have gotten their charter
from William Green or John L. Lewis. The Baltimore Sun, April
6, 1941, thought it quite anomalous that carpenters are not in a
trade but physicians are. See also, Washington (D.C.) Post, April
6, 1941; New York Times, April 7, 1941; Time, January 25, 1943,
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It was the defendant's admitted plan to hinder the successful
operation of Group Health Association which they claimed was un-
ethical.4 By doing this they also interfered with the activities of the
physicians hired By Group Health Association.
The courts have consistently held that the Sherman Act took over
the common law concept of restraint of trade.5 At common law the
word trade connoted other occupations than mere mercantile business
pursuits.6 Both the English and the American courts have practically
unanimously held that the medical profession was a trade within the
meaning of this concept.7 For this reason it appears that the practice
of medicine is a trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act.8
It also appears that the operation of a nonprofit organization
financing medical services and furnishing hospital facilities is a trade
within the meaning of the Sherman Act. In order to constitute trade
Vol. 41, No. 4. For testimony at the trial see 116 Amer. Med.
Assoc. Journal, 602, 611, 612, 714, 845; for prayers and motions
during the trial pp. 2199; for proceedings in general see pp. 1533,
1704, 2791.
4. 110 F.(2d) 703, 706 (1940). They hindered its operations by
the following methods. (a). Publishing a white list consisting
only of doctors not on Group Health's staff. (b) Expelling mem-
bers of Group Health from the American Medical Association.
(c) Requesting hospitals to prevent any Group Health doctor from
operating in their surgeries which request they enforced by re-
fusing to supply them with internes from medical schools if they
refused. (d) Threatening to discharge any member that even
consulted with a Group Health doctor.
5. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1939); Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers' Assoc. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 610
(1914); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1910).
6. Smalley v. Greene, 52 Iowa 241 (1879) (practice of law); Bunn
v. Guy, 4 East 190, 102 Eng. Rep. 803 (1803) (practice of law);
Love v. Kozy Theater Co., 193 Ky. 336, 236 S.W. 243 (1922)
(theatres); Jorden v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928) (hos-
pitals); see Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); see Styles
v. Lyons, 87 Conn. 23, 86 Atl. 564 (1913); see Gilman v. Dwight,
13 Gray 356 (Mass.), 74 Am. Dec. 634 (1859).
7. Styles v. Lyon, 87 Conn. 23, 86 Atl. 564 (1913); Cook v. Johnson,
47 Conn. 175, 36 Am Rep. 64 (1879); Ryan v. Hamilton, 144 Ill.
312, 68 N.E. 781 (1903); Halderman v. Simoton, 55 Iowa 144, 7
N.W. 493 (1880); Gilman v. Dwight, 13 Gray 356 (Mass.), 74
Am. Dec. 634 (1859); McNeel v. Wabash Ry. Co., 210 Mo. App.
161, 231 S.W. 649 (1921); Bowers v. Whittle, 63 N.H. 147, 56
Am. Rep. 499 (1884); Holdbrook v. Waters, 9 How. 335 (N.Y.)
(1854); Hulen v. Easel, 73 Pa. 927 (1903); McClung's Appeal, 58
Pa. 51 (1868); Turner v. Abbott, 116 Tenn. 718, 94 S.W. 64
(1906); Pratt v. British Medical Society, 1 K.B. 244 (1919);
Alkyns v. Kinner, 154 Eng. Rep. 1429 (1850); Horner v. Graves, 7
Bing. 733, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (1831). But see: Federal Trade
Com. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1930); The Nymph, 18 Fed.
Cas. 506 (1834); Earle v. Commonwealth, 180 Mass. 579, 63
N.E. 10 (1902); Semple v. Schwaz, 130 Mo. App. 65, 109 S.W.
633 (1908).
8. It will be noticed that while the circuit court held that the prac-
tice of medicine was a trade and the Supreme Court affirmed
this decision yet the Supreme Court did not expressly rule upon
this point in its decision.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
it is not necessary that the activity be carried on for profit.9 In fact
hospitals are generally held to be engaged in trade or business.10
However, the defendants claimed that even admitting these ac-
tivities to be trade or commerce that they were exempt from the oper-
ation of the Sherman Act by the Clayton Act" as expanded by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act 12 which forbids the issuance of an injunction
in a labor dispute. This defense was denied in the Court of Appeals
13
and in the Supreme Court.14
The American Medical Association also claimed that this action
taken against Group Health Association and its doctors was a mere
regulation by the American Medical Association of its members and
no one else was concerned or affected by it. 1' In the court below,
9. Non-profit cooperatives have been held to be doing business in
many situations. For purpose of qualifying with the corporation
laws of a foreign state: State ex rel Griffith v. Knights of Ku
Klux Klan, 119 Kan. 564, 572, 232 Pac. 254, 258 (1925); Ku Klux
Klan v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 500, 509, 122 S.E. 122, 125
(1924); For purposes of taxation: Maryland and Virginia Milk
Producers Assn. Inc. v. District of Col., 119F. (2d) 787 (1940);
Memphis Chamber of Commerce v. City of Memphis, 144 Tenn.
291, 232 S.W. 73 (1921). For complying with political corruption
practices: La Belle v. Hennepin Co. Bar Assn., 206 Minn. 290,
288 N.W. 788 (1939). Nor is it necessary to constitute trade or
business that it shall be carried on for profit. Hazen v. National
Life Assn., 101 F.(2d) 432, 438 (1939).
10. Jorden v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928); Lawrence v. Nissen,
173 N.C. 359, 91 S.E. 1036 (1917); Amendaz v. Hotel Dieu, 145
S.W. 1030 (1912).
11. 15 U.S.C. §17, 29 U.S.C. §52.
12. 29 U.S.C. §§104, 107, 108, 113.
13. 130 F.(2d) 233, 243 (1942).
14. 63 Sup. Ct. 326 (1943). As evidenced by the Congressional com-
mittee reports (H.R. Rep. No. 612, 62(nd) Congress, 2d session
and Senate Rep. No. 163, 72 (nd) Congress, 1st session) this
legislation was enacted in contemplation of disagreements between
workingmen or laborers or wage earners with employers. In
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), the court said,
"The Norris La-Guardia Act asserted the original purpose of the
Clayton Act by infusing into it the immunized trade union ac-
tivities." In Columbia River Packers Assoc. Inc. v. Hinton, 315
U.S. 142 (1940), it was held that private fishermen who belonged
to the C.I.O. but owned their own boats were private entrpreneurs
and their controversy with the packers was not a labor dispute
within the meaning of these acts since the stated public purpose
of these acts was to aid the individual laborer who was commonly
helpless to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment.
For these reasons the controversy of the Amer. Med. Assoc. with
its members and with the Group Health Assoc. did not come
within the immunization of the Norris La-Guardia and Clayton
Acts. See, (note) 29 Vir. L.Rev. 227 for a di3cussion on this
element of the case in the lower courts.
15. For the limitations upon a profession regulating itself, Fashion
Originators' Guild v. Fed. Trade Com., 312 U.S. 457 (1941). It
is also true that alleged beneficial ends to a group can not justify
illegal ends. Sugar Institute Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553
(1936). The New York Times, April 7, 1941, points out that the
American Medical Association has generally discouraged any ex-
perimentation with medical cooperatives. It alleges that before
1943]
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Judge Miller16 pointed out that professions exist as licensed monopolies
at the will of the people and the professions can not justify criminal
actions to prevent the development of new methods.'7
any legislation is passed concerning medical services on a na-
tionwide scale that experimentation of this type is sorely needed.
Evidence of the animosity to any medical cooperative is found in
an article written 2 years before the indictment by one of the
individual defendants. Jour. Amer. Med. Assn., Oct. 2, 1937, p.
39b. He forecast that physicians who sold their services to
Group Health would lose their professional status.
16. Amer. Med. Soc. v. United States, 130 F.(2d) 233, 245 (1942).
17. For the effect of changed circumstances on the legal profession,
see: Jackson, "An Organized American Bar," 18 Amer. Bar. Assoc.
Journal 383, 1932; Rutlege, "What Changed Conditions Must the
Lawyer Face in the Practice of Law," (1936) 9 Am. Law School
Review 1174; Llewelyn, "The Bar's Troubles and Poultices and
Cures" (1938) 5 Law and Contemp. Problems 107.
